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Literary and cultural studies of the US between the 1780s and 1830s have continually 
faced a unique burden within the larger domain of American studies, let alone the humanities 
in general. Within the field, this period has often been the subject of genteel lack of interest. 
Even when significant US-based Americanist scholars publish research within the time frame, 
the organic relation between this study and their larger reputation is often overlooked. The 
phase also faces categorical and political challenges. The still dominant designation of “early” 
(early American Republic, early national, and so on) casts a strong developmental undertow 
that inevitably presents its cultural production as prefatory, a prelude to more important, or at 
least more fully established, movements to come. Additionally, the productive tension 
between history and literature (broadly understood) that once animated American studies was 
and is more imbalanced here than elsewhere. The dominant forms of Anglo-American 
historiography have a greater grip on the years before 1850 as the major intermural research 
institutions and grant opportunities are unquestionably organized from the vantage of history 
departments. Historically, and certainly before digitization’s relative diminishing of the 
locational advantage of (East) coastal institutions, the geographic democratization of the later 
1700s and early 1800s was slower to materialize than for later periods in American Studies. 
Lastly, and most importantly, the cultural study of this period has, arguably, long existed 
under the force of right-wing political policing and associated publishing markets, due to its 
proximity to constitutional origination. Indeed, were it not for the openings provided by 
critical slavery studies, work on settler colonialism and indigeneity, and, to a lesser degree, 
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the new environmental humanities, scholars of this literary-cultural field might still have little 
room to manuever. 
 Cultural studies of the early republic and national period have also faced the 
continuing presence of four narrative mythologies about the US. Firstly, largely due to the 
success of a broad interregional group of nineteenth-century writers, who function as both 
powerful exemplars for their own time and as consecrated evidentiary foundations for the 
establishment of American studies as a discipline throughout most of the twentieth century, 
the idea came about that the American Revolution directly responded to the general crisis of 
the seventeenth century, rather than a conflict embedded within the long spiral of resistance to 
British mercantilism. Thanks to authors like Hawthorne, Emerson, and Melville, later 
scholars took it as self-evident that the new confederation and constitutional nation was 
created as an exercise in antinomianism rather than as a result of British difficulties in 
establishing and maintaining their first, “informal” Empire before the demise of Napoleon. In 
ways that have been little investigated, the writers of the 1830s onwards themselves to an 
invention of the seventeenth century, much as British Americans had for Roman history 
during the eighteenth. For a host of conjunctural reasons, not least being the search for a body 
of rhetorical justifications by the North for a legitimating casus belli for imminent sectional 
conflict, a wrinkle in time brought the seventeenth century in contact with the nineteenth that 
left the two decades on both sides of 1800 dislocated from the construction of a larger tale of 
US identity and what American studies understood as its proprietary archive.  
 The obscuring of the actual context for American independence has also made it hard 
to fully calibrate the effects of how a dominant interpretation of Adam Smith’s 1776 The 
Wealth of Nations arose in the early nineteenth century and became so dominant that it no 
longer saw itself as an interpretation at all. This version, which continues nearly unabated 
today, reads Smith as an advocate of competitive individuality rather than as a secular thinker 
grounded in the pursuit of sensibilitarian communality. Smith’s arguments for the invisible 
hand of the market place him close to the period’s deist notion of God as the absent 
clockmaker, and Smith’s antistatism is directed against ancien regime mercantilism, not 
social democracy or New Deal/welfare state formations.  
 The result of this erasure of Smith’s actual intellectual and social contexts has been 
that we currently lack a supple analytic terminology for distinguishing the important 
differences between eighteenth-century laissez-faire and the “free trade” imperial 
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expansionism of the early nineteenth century, and how the movement, as it were, from Smith 
to Ricardo was intertwined with the onset of Romantic-era literary nationalism and bourgeois 
interiority in order to fabulate an organic national lineage. 
 Another way to pose this problem is to note how an overarching term—liberalism— 
has been used in too general, too gross, a fashion to capture the differences between 
eighteenth-century antimercantilism, nineteenth-century free (imperialist) trade, and mid-
twentieth-century New Deal and military Keynesianism. Nearly a decade ago, in what 
retrospectively seems youthful optimism, I tried to put the liberalism-republicanism debate to 
bed as a question that could not be answered due to the incoherence and internally 
contradictory nature of these categories. What I had not seen was how the imminent debate 
over the meaning and provenance of neoliberalism would necessarily reinvigorate the zombie 
concept of liberalism or how one reinterpretation of republicanism would become subsumed 
within and recirculated in discussions over “the commons.” Now it seems clearer that such 
keywords locate a tension between egalitarian desires and the marketplace that is better seen 
as the structuring proposition of American studies as a discipline, its actual problematic, more 
than that of national exceptionalism. As long as we use the category of American studies, we 
will be enmeshed within iterations of the republican-liberalism debate. 
 One aspect of this antinomy appears with the third powerful mythology, which 
believes that Americans immediately operated under the weight of a sense of cultural and 
social inferiority to England that manifested itself in the spectrum of emulation or self-
defensive antagonism. This idea of immanent cultural cringe and “post”-colonial subalternity 
was, indeed, a creation of the late nineteenth century, partly the result of how strands of 
American fiction, such as the later Henry James, responded to the presence of Gilded Age 
robber barons whose conspicuous consumption sought to sanitize and celebrate their greed by 
marrying their daughters to played-out English aristocrats. 
 Yet well past the Civil War, Americans knew England as a socially backwards land 
whose General Intellect was mainly insufficient to handle the task of participating in the 
modern world. From Washington Irving’s sketchbook tales and George Lippard’s 
condemnation in Quaker City of Dora Livingstone’s desire for a landed title through 
Melville’s “Paradise of Bachelors” and Twain’s lampooning of Walter Scott-isms, Americans 
were confident in their lack of any need to consider England as anything other than an object 
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of pity. This absence of emulation may, after all, mark one actual feature that distinguishes 
Americans from other Anglophone settler colonies. 
 Yet this diffidence toward England should not be mistaken as the absence of 
perceived subordination. For if there was a nation that the educated American elites looked to 
for inspiration, it was clearly Germany as seen in early James with Basil Ransom’s admiring 
gaze on his Cambridge, Massachusetts cousin’s subscription to the Berliner Monatsschrift or 
Basil March’s insistence in Howells’s A Hazard of New Fortunes (1889/90) that his son be 
tutored to read German lyric in the original. When Americans went abroad for education, they 
ventured to Berlin, Göttingen, or Heidelberg. Oxford and Cambridge were simply considered 
as havens of involuted nonsense. Only as a result of the tremendous cultural amnesia enforced 
in the wake of the World Wars was the long duration of German influence and aura forgotten, 
precisely when early forms of American studies began to construct a narrative justification for 
its existence as an academic discipline.  
 The fourth major mythology was due to the inability of tourists to discern the 
unremarked power of the past. Here I mean mainly those French claims by Crévecoeur and 
Tocqueville that the US was able to develop as an unretarded democracy because it had no 
established landlord aristocracy that had to be overcome.  Yet while there might not have 
been de facto titles of lineage, in every state, both North and South, there were clearly known 
oligarchies of (landed) power that maintained limits to popular control. Alexander Hamilton 
had his career because he married into the Van Rensselaer clan, one of the richest and most 
powerful of post-Independence New York. Even while the expulsion of American Tories 
made it seem as if a gentry class was absent, the continuing power of patriot-landed and status 
clans was arguably more significant than the onset of political parties. It was perhaps only 
with the move toward free trade that the slow disestablishment of the landed forces began, 
and even then, more clearly in the North rather than the South’s slave manorial regions. 
 These mythologies are challenged and reinforced in various ways by two studies of 
emergent US writing: Joe Shapiro’s The Illiberal Imagination: Class and the Rise of the U.S. 
Novel and Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse’s Novels in the Time of Democratic 
Writing: The American Example. Both are excellent, insightful, and incisive studies that 
deserve to be required reading within all of American studies as they variously seek to 
address the larger question of liberalism, whether explicitly or structurally. They are similar 
in their approach of reading self-consciously fictional texts as illustrations of their chosen five 
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genres or narrative devices that characterize US writing from the 1790s until the 1830s 
(Shapiro) or 1850s (Armstrong and Tennenhouse). The two monographs are easily paired 
because they often devote themselves to considerations of the same texts. For instance, both 
suggest that Charles Brockden Brown’s Arthur Mervyn; or, Memoirs of the Year 1793 (1799) 
should stand as the most significant and exemplary US novel until roughly the 1840s. Yet 
despite their organizational similarities and mutual interest in particular titles, their 
methodology is vastly different, their claims ultimately incompatible, and their implied 
politics are divergent. 
 Shapiro (no relation) situates his study between two critical poles. The first involves 
Lionel Trilling’s The Liberal Imagination (1950) and Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in 
America (1955). Trilling exemplifies the claims of Cold War liberal pluralism that sought to 
define an American identity, and inferentially legitimate its postwar, anti-Communist global 
hegemony, by arguing that American literature was a statement of national exceptionality as 
the US novel arose in contrast to the otherwise prerequisite social conditions from which the 
Anglo-European novel emerged. For Trilling, the “real basis of the novel has never existed” 
in the US because “the tension between a middle class and an aristocracy which brings 
manners into observable relief” (qtd. in Shapiro, 1) was absent. Hartz likewise felt that 
American political history was free from class conflict and Europe’s proletarian radicalism 
because the US did not experience the need for an insurgent bourgeoisie to confront a local 
gentry in ways that would inevitably result in the generation of working-class conflict. 
Because Americans did not need a domestic bourgeois revolution, presumably because its 
results were carried over by seventeenth-century English émigrés, Hartz felt that Americans 
could stride the new continent as fully-fledged liberals, not as a “member of a class” but 
“instead as self-possessing individuals in a society that is essentially fluid” (2). 
 Shapiro flatly disagrees. His core claim is that “the consolidation of the early U.S. 
novel includes the representation of class struggle, and that the early U.S. novel helps to 
consolidate the U.S. bourgeoisie precisely through its representations of class inequality and 
class struggle” (3). Postwar advocates of liberalism promulgated circulationist claims in order 
to intertwine narratives of social mobility and free trade alongside developmental predicates, 
and thus to resist suspiciously marxist New Deal market controls and purportedly Communist 
Party “lines” of the midcentury Cultural Front. Shapiro argues instead that because of the 
intentional and integral role of class control in early American writing, if there is a 
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foundational national imagination, it is more accurately defined as illiberal. From the 
inception of the US novel, authors crafted an ensemble of generic “rejoinders to emergent 
forms of oppositional political economy” (189) that either seek to “teach us that disaffection 
with class inequality breeds dangerous desires and unleashes dangerous behaviors” or “that 
class inequality is itself good for individuals, and that classes should not be thought of as 
fundamentally antagonistic” (192-93).  
 On first glance, Shapiro’s chosen confrontation with Trilling and Hartz might seem to 
be its own form of antiquarianism. After all, Trilling’s and Hartz’s anti-Communism seems 
an obsolete position in the post-1989 era. Not only would one be hard pressed to find serious 
(or at least currently influential) proponents of this claim of classless America, but even 
harder pressed to find members of Shapiro’s scholarly generation (or younger!) who are even 
familiar with these 1950s positions, which are most likely no longer present on 
comprehensive exams. The force then of Illiberal Imagination’s project comes with Shapiro’s 
conclusion that addresses the new congeries of surface, descriptive, or postcritique criticism. 
While Shapiro is willing to divorce himself from symptomatic or depth reading, not least 
because he does not see early US writing as hiding the presence of oppositional political 
economy, he is less willing to abandon the notion of critique. Such a move he finds to be its 
own form of (bourgeois) complicity with existing structures of power as well as being coeval 
with contemporary (neoliberal) claims that there is no utopian alternative to the social orders 
on offer today. Shapiro thus raises a question about the structural and tactical similarities 
between Trilling’s insistence on the individual complexity of texts, which nonetheless 
buttresses a collective, market-oriented national identity, as a means of excluding or baiting 
left modes of scholarship, and contemporary instances of postcritique. For Illiberal 
Imagination implies that Rita Felski’s rejection of context functions to give a new tongue to 
Trilling’s denunciation of his own colleagues’ socially oriented literary criticism.  
 Shapiro contends that the early American novel’s dedication to instantiating 
economic inequality can be seen at the level of form with the use of five subgenres: the 
bildungsroman, the episodic travel narrative, the sentimental novel, the frontier romance, and 
the antislavery novel. Each genre handles one of a shared, multifaceted perspective. The 
bildungsroman is preoccupied with poverty and wage labor. Brown’s Arthur Mervyn and 
Ormond are read as aspirational tales that suggest that poverty is a useful stage for the 
individual to forge character on their way to a higher-class station, usually achieved through 
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unexpectedly bequeathed wealth or marriage. For Shapiro, Brown presents a 
Wollstonecraftian critique about those who are born into wealth as too physically and morally 
compromised, while those who have experience initial hardship are better trained to 
leadership. On the other hand, those who do not cheerfully accept their poverty are positioned 
as villains, unworthy of reward. No complaints, please, we’re American.  
 If the bildungsroman is disinclined to examine the original separation of class and its 
social selection, the picaresque tale, represented by Hugh Henry Breckenridge’s Modern 
Chivalry (792-1815), stages a more explicit commitment to rule by a lettered class of 
economic and educated elites. While the bildungsroman motivates a tale of upward 
movement, the episodic travel narrative tends to repetitive events to indicate that the absence 
of social mobility is best for all. Hence, the bildungsroman and the picaresque are “different 
but complementary: if Brockden Brown’s novels function as apprenticeships to ‘poverty,’ 
Modern Chivalry conversely stands as a defense of ‘the Few’” (75) in ways that suggest that 
the novel’s readers should also feel confirmed in this elite by their own textual consumption. 
 Illiberal Imagination then jumps from the 1790s to the 1830s for its three other genre 
categories. Catherine M. Sedgwick’s The Poor Rich Man, and the Rich Poor Man (1836) and 
Live and Let Live (1836) are read as consciously hostile to emerging socialist utopian thought 
as the novels use a providential logic in order to validate inequality. The rich, as Shapiro 
reads Sedgwick, should strive for justice and mercy to the poor, but the poor need to enact 
humility, fidelity, and gratitude. Any nascent anticapitalist class-consciousness by 
proletarians must be blocked by the celebration of sentimental, paternalist relations James 
Fenimore Cooper’s Littlepage novels—Satanstoe (1845), The Chainbearer (1846) and The 
Redskins (1846)—written amidst the Anti-Rent Wars of 1839-47 that threatened large 
landowners, such as Cooper himself, exemplify the frontier romance. As Marius Bewley 
wrote in 1959, “Cooper’s aim was to praise landed wealth, transmitted through families, at 
the expense of wealth gained by speculation or industrial enterprise” (qtd. in 136). Shapiro 
adds that Cooper’s novels also mobilize a defense of “democratic marriage practices and the 
affective autonomy of middle-class women” as imperiled by land reformers’ critiques of 
rentier ownership. The trick of the books is to persuade middle-class readers that agrarian 
egalitarianism threatens the freedom of companionate marriage and to suggest to working-
class readers, in turn, the benefits of racial privilege if they distance their concerns from 
Native Americans and black slaves about being bound to a land controlled by others. 
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Shapiro’s last genre choice involves Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Dred (1856), which offers a 
mechanism of expression for ending class inequality among whites, by presenting the 
existence of slavery as blocking class equality in both the North and South. Yet by 
highlighting slavery as a means of degrading the Northern working class, Stowe 
simultaneously distracts the reader from an ensuing critique of capitalism that may explain 
why class inequality exists in the first place.  
 Illiberal Imagination is adroitly argued and presents a refreshingly different 
cartography of American letters as each chapter takes up lesser-known texts to unsettle the 
field’s assumptions that had been protected by selective reading lists. Yet does the 
periodization impact the discussion of genre and American particularity? Is there an 
integrating coherence between the 1790s and 1830s, in terms of market forms, 
industrialization, slavery and Native American removals, political partisanship, and the 
commercial market for fiction? Are Shapiro’s five genres uniformly present or do they 
change density in relation to historical transformations? While separating the genres out is 
doubtless a momentary heuristic for the purpose of clarity, few texts are easily separated in 
this fashion. The cross-hatching of different generic modes also gives texts a complexity that 
enables readers to consume them in different ways. For instance, while Shapiro favorably 
contrasts the radical intent of George Lippard’s Quaker City (1844) against Stowe’s Dred, 
Lippard’s final pairing of Luke Harvey and Devil-Bug’s daughter is similar to how Brown’s 
Arthur Mervyn concludes with Mervyn’s marriage to Achsa, a daughter of the socially 
excluded. What then allows Quaker City to escape Shapiro’s critique of Arthur Mervyn? 
While he persuasively accounts for the initial American novel’s engagement with class, to 
what degree, if any, can these moves be considered as particularly, or even especially, 
American? 
 Shapiro’s study makes for a useful contrast to Armstrong and Tennenhouse’s Novels 
in the Time of Democratic Writing. A product of long and estimable careers, Armstrong and 
Tennenhouse’s study seeks to reshape the way we understand inaugural American novelistic 
writing. Whereas Shapiro’s study focuses on much lesser-known novels, Armstrong and 
Tennenhouse’s does this as well, but also boldly addresses some of the most familiar texts of 
Poe and Cooper, as well as figures now better-read within the revised canon. 
 Challenging Benedict Anderson’s claim in Imagined Communities that print 
capitalism created what Marx called an “illusory community” [illusorische 
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Gemeinschaftlichkeit] in The German Ideology, Armstrong and Tennenhouse point to 
Anderson’s admission that he had incompletely considered global currents in his focus on the 
trajectory of individual nations. Consequently, they claim that “if ‘nations and the nation 
states’ had to be rethought in relation to global ‘currents’ then novels had to be rethought in 
these terms as well” (5). Deploying network theory, Armstrong and Tennenhouse’s basic 
claims are that there is such a thing as the “American novel,” that it was established in sole 
opposition to the “British novel,” and that it did so by rejecting the latter’s commitment to 
hierarchical territory in favor of a dedication to ongoing movement. By creating a networked 
form of address, wherein all could equally address all, American “novelists produced a social 
system that succeeded in recruiting early American readers” into a national collective (10). 
 Using Austen’s novels as their normative model for the British novel, Armstrong and 
Tennenhouse assert that such narratives are organized by the fear that “inherited property is in 
danger of falling into the hands of strangers, thereby threatening to leave the next 
generation—largely represented by women—without a home or income” (20). To preserve 
land ownership, Austen perfects a formal technique of personal appropriateness, involving the 
right to maintain land ownership, not in simply labouring it, as with Locke’s justification, but 
by typifying a behavioral style of “education, taste, and sensibility” (21). Thus “Austen 
addressed the problem of property by means of marriage plots that supplemented inherited 
property with commercial wealth, intelligence, a fine sensibility, and social benevolence . . . 
to expand a relatively exclusive set of relationships” (27). Although not expressed in these 
terms, Armstrong and Tennenhouse claim that the British novel (of Austen and Scott 
primarily) depend on what Gramsci would call a restoration without revolution, the 
establishment of a bourgeois faction that assumes a leadership role by helping to create a 
social coalition between eighteenth-century rentiers, who were slipping into crisis, and the 
emerging wealth of plantation and industry wherein access to gentry status will now be less 
by blood lineage than through a form of bourgeois mésalliance sealed by gentle(wo)manly 
style, behavioral attributes, and perception. In this fusion of aesthetics and property, readers 
of fine prose can imagine themselves as likely inhabitants of the manor as much as the 
novel’s fictional characters.  
 The US tradition, exemplified by Arthur Mervyn, rejects the varnished Austenian 
compromise between landed and bourgeois interests. Instead of seeking geographic fixity, the 
American novel, as Armstrong and Tennenhouse define it, dedicates itself to circulationist 
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principles, which we might say register the presence of free trade and antitariff ideology. 
American identity is thus based not on aspects of appropriateness, but a dedication to a 
mobile network that legitimates (frontier) nationality. “Insofar as property removed such 
people, goods, and information from circulation and limited the extent of such circulation 
itself,” it could not “provide the foundation of a social system that could expand and diversify 
and still cohere” (10). For Armstrong and Tennenhouse, early American novels put 
“considerable labor in a sequence of five formal moves, or tropes” (10-11) in order to reverse 
“a comparable move on the part of British novels of the period” (11). The five moves are 
dispersal, population by minor characters, a conversion from captivity toward a “highly 
volatile network of horizontal affiliations,” the creation of a hub or relay of social interaction, 
and a form of anamorphosis that requires a complete set of perspectival angles (10-12).  
 In each of these forms, Armstrong and Tennenhouse suggest that the American novel 
was dedicated to (Smithian) liberalism, understood as the need to remove all social and 
geographic friction that might slow, obstruct, or redirect flowing circulation. Democracy is 
thus defined not as a mode of representative government, but by “the infectious feeling of 
affiliation” manifested “in the forms of behavior characterized as popular democracy” that 
“opens up unlimited circulation and . . . freedom to associate” (12).  
 For readers to gain the full reach of Armstrong and Tennenhouse’s readings, they 
have to take as axiomatic that American readers and writers were hermetically sealed away 
from continental languages and literary traditions, that both British and American writing was 
fairly homogeneous in its construction, and that racial and class inequalities are easily made 
unremarkable through movement, even for the dispersions experienced by Native and black 
Americans. For instance, their introductory chapter ends by using the dyad of American 
mobility and British fixity to interpret the canon: “What are the twin protagonists of 
Huckleberry Finn, after all, if not more companionable but no less incompatible actors in 
exactly this argument—Huck the errant principle of free circulation and preferential 
attachments and Tom the principle of a community linked to and supported by property” (16). 
Yet most readers after Leo Marx consider that the novel’s dynamics are actually generated in 
the first instance by the self-emancipating slave Jim, whose flight is that which mobilizes the 
novel’s opposition of Huck and Tom. Similarly, by using the category “early American 
literary studies” to include slave narratives of the 1850s, Armstrong and Tennenhouse both 
avoid the question of intervening historical thresholds, but also functionally use “early” to 
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replace “antebellum,” a term that for all its imprecision does make the role of slavery central 
to the period’s historical narrative.  
 In this way, Armstrong and Tennenhouse’s study usefully collides with Shapiro’s. 
Both suggest that Brown’s Arthur Mervyn ought to be taken as a touchstone for the American 
novel before Hawthorne or Melville. While Armstrong and Tennenhouse see Brown as 
preserving society through movement, Shapiro sees Arthur’s ultimate matrimonial settlement 
as a tactic of privilege and inequality that functions analogously to Armstrong and 
Tennenhouse’s reading of Austen.  
 An old joke goes that network theory is what is left over when one starts with cultural 
materialism and strips out capitalism, class (and other forms of) struggle, and the catalysts of 
historical transformation. Yet such is the sophistication of Novels that only a small translation 
of their keywords into more materialist ones may open it up for a larger readership. For 
instance, we might replace the term of dispersion with the one of accumulation by 
dispossession, and likewise substitute commodity chains for population, exchange-value for 
conversion, marketplaces for hubs, and the totality of the expanded circuit of capital for 
anamorphosis.  
 Armstrong and Tennenhouse intriguingly end their study by claiming that Cooper’s 
The Last of the Mohicans introduced a new framework that vanquished the network novel of 
initial American writing and bequeathed the resulting lack of interest in the period’s fiction. 
They read Cooper as producing a new model of liberal pluralism as it includes the 
experiences of Native and black Americans in ways that allow ethnic white Americans to 
both lay claim to these other groups’ presence while also ensuring their structural erasure. 
Although Armstrong and Tennenhouse do not use these terms, the conceptual torque of their 
claims means that they anachronistically read The Last of the Mohicans as the first military 
Keynesian novel, so that the 1820s stand as the start of a phase that continues unchanged 
throughout the 1950s and beyond. To reclaim the promise of the network novel before 
Cooper, Armstrong and Tennenhouse suggest we need to embark on postpluralist literary 
studies. While it would be ungenerous to merely label this position as a form of center-left 
neoliberalism, it would equally be wrong to overlook the study’s theorized commitment to a 
mode of reading that Shapiro might suggest that we have not yet entirely earned the right to 
accumulate. 
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